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A comprehensive legal theory is needed to prevent the persis-
tence of sexual harassment. Although requiring sexual favors as a
quid pro quo for job retention or advancement clearly is unjust,
the task of translating that obvious statement into legal theory is
difficult. To do so, one must define sexual harassment and decide
what the law's role in addressing harassment claims should be.
In Sexual Harassment of Working Women,1 Catharine Mac-
Kinnon attempts all of this and more. In making a strong case that
sexual harassment is sex discrimination and that a legal remedy
should be available for it, the book proposes a new standard for
evaluating all practices claimed to be discriminatory on the basis
of sex. Although MacKinnon's "inequality" theory2 is flawed and
its implications are not considered sufficiently, her formulation of
it makes the book a significant contribution to the literature of sex
discrimination.
MacKinnon calls upon the law to eliminate not only sex dis-
crimination but also most instances of sexism from society.3 She
uses traditional theories in an admittedly strident manner,4 and
relies upon both traditional and radical-feminist sources. 5 The re-
sults of her effort are mixed. The book is at times fresh and chal-
lenging, at times needlessly provocative. Often it is lucid, but too
often it is confusing and cumbrous. Although ostensibly addressed
t Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
1 C. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference as MAcKINoN].
I The theory is set out in id. at 6, 106-27, 174-92.
w She recognizes, however, that the legal system cannot eliminate all sexism. "Few
would want every passing glance to be legally actionable sex discrimination. In this sense,
what is 'sex discrimination' will always be narrower that what is 'sexist."' Id. at 95.
4 She speaks of the book's "embattled tone." Id. at xii.
' E.g., id. at 243 n.20 (traditional economic and sociological references); id. at 253 n.66,
255 n.93, 281 n.34 (less traditional sources).
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both to the public and to attorneys,6 the book inadequately in-
troduces much of the material, rendering it difficult for most
nonlawyers to understand.7 Most disturbing is that despite the
work's generally heavy reliance on documentation, MacKinnon
does not back up her more striking and challenging assertions-the
statements that are most in need of support. This last fault, in
particular, detracts from the seriousness of her work.8
It may be somewhat unreasonable, however, to require full
scholarly documentation and freedom from tendentiousness in ex-
pressing innovative ideas about a problem that only recently has
begun to be recognized. It was not until a 1976 Redbook magazine
survey,9 in which 90% of the respondents reported personal exper-
iences of sexual harassment on the job,10 that the public became
6 Id. at xii.
7 For example, MacKinnon's textual discussion of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), does not mention that the case was a constitutionally based claim, brought under the
fifth amendment, rather than a statutorily based claim, brought under Title VII as was
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a case she also discusses. MACKINNON at 134.
This crucial fact is given only footnote mention, id. at 277 n.113. Moreover, MacKinnon
never discusses the difference between the two types of cases.
The book is useful to an attorney familiar with the law of employment discrimination.
Nonlawyers, however, will appreciate the work more for its provocative analysis of sexism
than as a source of instruction in sex discrimination law.
9 MacKinnon's research is uneven. An example is her failure to mention animal behav-
ior studies on sexuality and aggression, some of which show that male dominance is more a
result of habitat than of innate characteristics, a point that would help her position. See,
e.g., Bowden, Further Implications of Cultural Surgency and Sex-Dominance, 75 AM. AN-
THROPOLOGIST 176 (1973) (discussing male-dominant and equidominant societies); Brown, A
Note on the Division of Labor by Sex, 72 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1073 (1973) (discussing the-
ories of why women in various cultures perform only certain types of work); Sanday, Toward
a Theory of the Status of Women, 75 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1682 (1973) (discussing the
relation between economic production by women and female status); Williams, The Argu-
ment Against Physiological Determination of Female Roles: A Reply to Pierre L. van den
Berghe's Rejoinder to Williams' Extension of Brown's Article, 75 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
1725, 1726 (1973) ("[Flemales without children can and do participate in 'male' activities.
For humans, however, it is often culture, not physiology, that prohibits even females with-
out children from participating in male activities." (emphasis in original)). MacKinnon's
main source for cross-cultural data on sex roles is Margaret Mead. See, e.g., MAcKINNON at
281 n.31. Similarly, she could have expanded her references to the literature on biology and
race.
The book contains technical defects as well. Although the author employs hundreds of
citations, the footnotes are difficult to consult, because they are arranged by chapters, sepa-
rately numbered, all at the end of the text. This is offset, in part, by an unusually good
index.
Safran, What Men Do To Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harass-
ment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149.
10 A serious shortcoming of the survey was that the respondents were self-selected. The
report nevertheless is suggestive of the problem.
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interested in the subject. The popular press condemned the impo-
sition of sexual demands in the workplace,11 but some courts were
not persuaded that the practice constituted unlawful sex discrimi-
nation." MacKinnon's theory is designed to overcome what she
perceives as the shortcomings in the traditional theories of sex dis-
crimination by providing a comprehensive theoretical basis for the
courts to apply.
I. DEFINING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
MacKinnon defines sexual harassment as "the unwanted im-
position of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power."1 s She says that the problem is not the result of
excessive sexual attraction of men to women; rather, sexual harass-
ment; like rape, is "dominance eroticized."" It is the sexual ex-
pression of the economic dominance men have over women in the
workplace, equivalent to the sexual and economic dominance she
believes men have in the home. As MacKinnon puts it,
"[e]conomic power is to sexual harassment as physical force is to
rape.)1 5
She distinguishes two broad types of sexual demands in the
workplace.16 The first is the "quid pro quo" situation, in which a
1, E.g., Nolan, Sex and the Working Woman-Harassment on the Job, Louisville Cou-
rier-J. & Times, Nov. 16, 1975, § G, at 1, col. 1. See also L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAMOWN
(1978).
2 Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated mem.,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). This undoubtedly was due at least in part to fears by courts
that there would be problems of proof and frivolous lawsuits. Such supposed difficulties
generally should not be accorded significant weight because they could be used to deny.
relief in almost all causes of action. More particularly, the concern with problems of proof
may be related to an apprehension by male judges that men will be accused wrongfully, a
fear explained in part because perpetrators of sexual harassment may see themselves as
innocent, see Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("[W]ho is to
say what degree of sexual cooperation would found a Title VII claim? It is conceivable...
that flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability."), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979); MACKINNON at 97. The offending men may view their activity as "normal" be-
cause many males, being able to engage in sexual intercourse only when aroused, associate
sexual activity with pleasure and therefore assume that women do so as well.
13 MACKINNON at 1. She says that sexual harassment is "sufficiently pervasive... as to
be nearly invisible." Id.
14 Id. at 162. MacKinnon suggests that rape is not so much deviance as overconformity
to the male sex role. Id. at 156. For a further discussion of the theoretical similarity of rape
to sexual harassment, see id. at 215-21.
Is Id. at 217-18.
Is Although the book is concerned mainly with harassment at the workplace, MacKin-
non also notes cases brought by students against university professors. Id. at 54, 68, 238, 295
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person in a position of authority demands sexual attention in ex-
change for an employment benefit. 17 The second is the "condition
of work" situation, in which a person is subjected to repeated sex-
ual insults or sexual invitations unaccompanied by an offer of em-
ployment benefit.18
Complicating the development of a legal theory is the broad
range of possible responses by the victim to the harassment, and
by the perpetrator to the victim's response. A sexual invitation, for
example, may elicit either compliance or defiance. 19 Compliance
may prompt either the fulfillment or abrogation of the promise by
the perpetrator.20 Defiance may evoke overt retaliation, mere hos-
tility, or no reaction at all.
The clearest legal case is the one in which a supervisor makes
a sexual advance; the female subordinate refuses; and the supervi-
sor retaliates by witholding an employment benefit. Most sexual
harassment cases have been of this type, and the courts usually
have granted relief. 1 If the woman refuses and the supervisor ig-
nores the past event, treats the employee fairly, and never bothers
her again, however, it is less clear that there is a cognizable claim. 22
The legal situation also is unclear if the woman complies with the
sexual demand but is denied her quid pro quo.23 The "condition of
work" cases likewise present difficult problems, because the perpe-
trator often is a coworker rather than a supervisor; the question is
whether the employer has a duty to take action to prevent such
harassment. 4
n.176.
17 Id. at 32-40.
18 Id. at 40-47.
29 Id. at 32-33.
20 Id. at 36-37.
'1 E.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
According to MacKinnon, the woman has no legal cause of action because there is no
injury. "In this one turn of events, there truly is 'no harm in asking."' MACKINNON at 33
(footnote omitted).
23 Id.
24 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has issued guidelines
on sexual harassment that impose liability in such situations.
§ 1604.11 Sexual harassment.
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible
for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
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With so many varieties of offending behavior and of responses
to it, there may be substantially different kinds of injuries. 5 Many
cases will present questions about whether anyone actually was in-
jured, or about whether certain conduct constituted discrimination
based upon sex. There also are public policy questions for courts
and theorists to consider; denying the claim of a compliant woman,
for example, may encourage further harassment, whereas enforcing
the promise after compliance may encourage others to comply.2 8
MacKinnon attempts to dispel the notion that compliant em-
ployees have no right to complain. A compliant woman, she says,
has suffered the injury of being forced to meet an unfair job re-
quirement;27 her noncomplying competitors also are injured.2 8 Fur-
thermore, compliance rarely works an advantage: "[T]he statistics
on discrimination suggest that no fulfillment of any requirement,
sexual demands included, results in job status for which women
are qualified, much less undeserved advancement. '29
Moreover, she says in a typically provocative digression,
women's economic dependence on men for survival makes speaking
of consensual compliance virtually meaningless.30 She argues that
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74677 (1980) (to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11). The condition-of-work type of sexual harassment is no less likely to im-
pair a woman's job performance than the quid pro quo type. See MAcKINNON at 51.
One of the few cases involving condition-of-work harassment is Continental Can Co. v.
State, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1808 (Minn. July 3, 1980), which involved a state constitu-
tional provision rather than Title VII. The court said that "[d]ifferential treatment on the
basis of sex is... invidious, although less recognizable, when employment is conditioned
either explicitly or impliedly on adapting to a workplace in which repeated and unwelcome
sexually derogatory remarks and sexually motivated physical conduct are directed at an em-
ployee because she is female." Id. at 1813.
5 MACKINNON at 33-40.
26 Id. at 37.
." Id. at 37-39.
Under EEOC guidelines, the woman's competitors have an action against the em-
ployer in such a case:
Section 1604.11 Sexual harassment.
(g) Other related practices. Where employment opportunities or benefits are
granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimina-
tion against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportu-
nity or benefit.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74677 (1980) (to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11).
M1 AcKINNON at 38-39.
SO Sexual harassment perpetuates the interlocked structure by which women have been
kept sexually in thrall to men and at the bottom of the labor market. Two forces of
American society converge: men's control over women's sexuality and capital's control
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compliance is not consent because women typically submit to sex-
ual intercourse out of physical or economic coercion: "'[M]any
women's . . . participation in sexual activity, has often-
historically, possibly more often than not-had little to do with
their own sense of the erotic.'-"1 Although there may be some
truth to this untested observation, it is incompatible with a schol-
arly attempt to develop objective legal theory. Moreover, such pro-
vocative remarks detract from the many valuable observations
MacKinnon does make.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS SEx DISCRIMINATION
Although MacKinnon acknowledges that most sexual harass-
ment constitutes sex discrimination under either the disparate
treatment or the disparate impact theories of discrimination, she
believes that these traditional approaches are inadequate. There-
fore she proposes an expansive legal theory designed to eliminate
all vestiges of sex discrimination from American society.
A. Traditional Theories
MacKinnon categorizes the disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories under the single heading of the "differences" ap-
proach to sex discrimination, 2 which she contrasts with her own
"inequality" approach. Under the differences approach, distinc-
tions based on stereotypes ss or arbitrary classifications34 are pro-
over employees' work lives. Women historically have been required to exchange sexual
services for material survival, in one form or another. Prostitution and marriage as well
as sexual harassment in different ways institutionalize this arrangement.
Id. at 174-75.
31 Id. at 152 (quoting THE SExuAL SCENE 4 (J. Gagnon & W. Simon eds. 1970)) (foot-
note omitted). In one of many provocative references she uses to support her theory, Mac-
Kinnon quotes a prostitute's experience:
"[My first trick] wasn't traumatic because my training had been how to be a hustler
anyway. I learned it from the society around me, just as a woman. We're taught how to
hustle, how to attract, hold a man, and give sexual favors in return.... It's a market
place transaction .... the most important thing in life is the way men feel about
you .... It's not too far removed from what most American women do-which is to
put on a big smile and act . . .What I did was no different from what ninety-nine per
cent of American women are taught to do. I took the money from under the lamp
instead of in Arpege. What would I do with 150 bottles of Arpege a week?"
MACKINNON at 217 (quoting S. TERKEL, WORKING 58, 59, 61 (1974)) (footnote omitted).
'1 MACKINNON at 107-16, 193-208. She admits that the disparate impact analysis at
times incorporates elements of her inequality standard. Id. at 132.
Id. at 101, 179.
Id. at 110.
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hibited. The theory states that discrimination between similarly
situated (comparable) persons is unlawful, but there is no discrimi-
nation when there is different treatment if persons are differently
situated, or really are different.-5 In MacKinnon's view, the compa-
rability requirement of the differences approach is unrealistic be-
cause the theory
proceeds by comparing people who, because of social inequal-
ity, are simply noncomparable .... The approach protects
primarily women who for all purposes are socially men, blacks
who for all purposes are socially white, leaving untouched
those whose lives will never be the same as the more privi-
leged precisely because of race or sex.36
MacKinnon also says that a problem with a theory that
brands distinctions based on stereotypes as unlawful is that the
stereotypes often are real. In discussing a case that held that air-
lines could not refuse to hire male stewards, 7 she maintains that
women really are better suited than men to be flight attendants.
"Due to social conditioning, women as a group probably are more
supportive toward anxious others; both sexes have learned to ac-
cept nurturance and support more readily from women than from
men."
38
Another problem with the differences approach is that it re-
quires a group reference. The theory requires that to be held un-
lawful, "[a] detrimental differentiation must contain enough of a
group reference to be arguably based on a social category, rather
than a unique or individual quality, but it must be presented as an
injury to an individual."3 9 Some early cases used this requirement
in holding that the harassment was a "personal proclivity";4 0 those
35 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), for example, approved employers' disability plans that provided no benefits for preg-
nancy, holding that different treatment was acceptable when based on real differences.
"[T]o be sex-based, a treatment (or classification or factor) must be universal to women but
not unique to women." MAcKNNON at 150. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 & n.20,
497 (1974). See also Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62
CALIF. L. Rlv. 1532 (1974) (discussing Geduldig).
MACKINNON at 126.
' Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971).
" MACKNNON at 181. Such was the finding of the trial court in Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 564-66 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
:, MAcKINNON at 106.
40 Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 ("[The harassment was] essentially the
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cases held that the treatment was based on sexuality, not sex.41
Calling the harassment personal erroneously implies that the
group reference demanded by antidiscrimination law is absent.
Such a reference does exist, however, even when a sexual advance
is made to only one woman. Recent cases42 have recognized that if
the harassment was not or would not have been visited upon like-
situated males, the imposition of the condition was sex based and
thus unlawful."
Another theory, used in some of the early sexual harassment
cases, holds that there cannot be sex discrimination if both men
and women can be subject to the harassment. Rejecting it, Mac-
Kinnon argues that the spectre of bisexual harassment "takes seri-
ously the sexual harassment of nobody"'44 and that occurrences of
sexual harassment by women "will probably be only slightly more
common than occurrences of a man raped by a woman or incest
initiated by women against male children.' 45 If this theory were
combined with the "comparability" requirement, relief would be
isolated and unauthorized misconduct of one employee to another" (footnote omitted)),
rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); accord, Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,
163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
"I MacKinnon examines the use of this defense and discusses the sexism underlying it.
MACKINNON at 83-90.
42 Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1977);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 & n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business
Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451
F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459,
465 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658-59, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
43 MacKinnon explains how the disparate treatment theory applies to claims of sexual
harassment:
As a practice, sexual harassment singles out a gender-defined group, women, for special
treatment in a way which adversely affects and burdens their status as employees. Sex-
ual harassment limits women in a way men are not limited. It deprives them of oppor-
tunities that are available to male employees without sexual conditions. In so doing, it
creates two employment standards: one for women that includes sexual requirements,
one for men that does not. From preliminary indications, large numbers of working
women, regardless of characteristics which distinguish them from each other, report
being sexually harassed. Most sexually harassed people are women. These facts indi-
cate that the incidents are something more than "personal" and "unique" and have
some connection to the female condition as a whole.
MAcKINNON at 193.
4" Id. at 201. MacKinnon notes that a male who is harassed by a male supervisor is in a
position to ruin his supervisor's career by publicizing the harassment. By contrast, women
probably will be unable to ruin a man's career because people are more likely to excuse the
conduct: "women are widely supposed to 'want' heterosexual relationships which they re-
ject." Id. at 205.
45 Id. at 202.
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impossible in all sexual harassment cases: if only women are bur-
dened, there is no discrimination because no males are similarily
situated; where both men and women are burdened, there is no
discrimination because in theory the harassment is not unique to
one sex.
B. The Inequality Approach
To remedy the perceived flaws in the traditional sex discrimi-
nation theories, MacKinnon proposes an "inequality approach"
designed to outlaw "all practices which subordinate women to
men.""' Her theory starts from the assumption that social condi-
tioning is more determinative of a person's sexual identity than the
physical aspects of sex-gonads, hormones, and chromosomes. 7
Accordingly, she says, "the legally relevant content of the term sex,
understood as gender difference, should focus upon its social
meaning more than upon any biological givens."'48 Thus a chal-
lenged policy or practice is discriminatory not merely when a dif-
ferentiation is arbitrarily based on physical differences, but also
when it "integrally contributes to the maintenance of an under-
class or a deprived position because of gender status." 9 In her
view, to hold a practice unlawful, "[a]ll that is required are com-
paratively unequal results." 50
MacKinnon provides several examples of how the inequality
approach would apply in sex discrimination cases. The theory
would yield an opposite result from the cases that approved the
denial of pregnancy benefits in employers' disability plans."'
"[Such a plan] discriminates on the basis of sex because pregnancy
has a direct relation to sex, and produces immediate disadvantages
for employment for women only-and that is the end of the argu-
ment. '52 In sexual harassment cases, the argument that there is no
discrimination if the practice can happen to both sexes would be
41 Id. at 4. The theory is to be "a political strategy to guide legal intervention." Id. at
127.
4- Id. at 151-55. She employs studies of hermaphroditism, e.g., Money, Developmental
Differentiation of Femininity and Masculinity Compared, in THE POTENTIAL OF WOMEN 51,
56 (S. Farber & R. Wilson eds. 1963). She uses no animal behavior studies, however; one she
might have used is Denham, Energy Relations and Some Basic Properties of Primate So-
cial Organization, 73 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 77 (1971).
41 MAcKINNON at 158 (emphasis in original).
40 Id. at 117.
60 Id. at 118.
51 Those cases are discussed in note 35 supra.
s' MACKINNON at 123 (emphasis in original).
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inapplicable because the social significance of sex is different for
men than for women. A woman is likely to consider a sexual ad-
vance by a man "intrusive, denigrating, and depotentiating,"
whereas a man may view a similar advance by a woman as an en-
dorsement of his sexual potency and attractiveness. 3 To draw an
analogy from racial attitudes, neither skin color nor racial epithets
have the same social meaning for whites as for blacks.5"
Under MacKinnon's theory, the lack of comparability between
the sexes would not be "a permissible basis for socially perpetuat-
ing women's disadvantages."" Where there is no comparability be-
cause of biological differences or different social meanings, Mac-
Kinnon's theory would require a discovery and investigation of all
real differences between the sexes to establish whether those dif-
ferences result from sexism. She acknowledges that the sexes dif-
fer, but says that the differences connote an inferiority of women
only because the standard used to judge women is that of men."6
Her theory looks at results-if they are unequal, a presumption
arises that the challenged practices are sexually discriminatory.5 7
C. Critique of the Inequality Approach
MacKinnon's theory is ambiguous, unworkable, and unneces-
sary. She never adequately explains why her theory is preferable to
the disparate impact analysis. The book addresses few of the sub-
stantial problems the use of the theory would present. MacKinnon
never explains, for example, how sexism should be investigated,
nor does she indicate possible defenses to discrimination claims
under her theory. Would an investigation of the social meaning of
sex conclude that questions concerning family planning are inap-
propriate inquiries of female job applicants?" Would an investiga-
tion conclude that business necessity is an invalid defense? If, as
she suggests, women have developed those qualities and skills cor-
responding to the female stereotype,59 what is an employer to do
when a job demands those qualities and skills corresponding to the
male stereotype, which no female applicant may command? Fur-
53 Id. at 171.
5" Id.
" Id. at 5.
" Id. at 127.
57 Id. at 118.
5 MacKinnon probably would prohibit such inquiries because they serve to "reinforce
the traditionally disproportionate burden of parenthood on women." Id. at 225.
" See text and notes at notes 37-38 supra.
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thermore, although she approves of affirmative action, 0 MacKin-
non fails to indicate the extent to which it or other methods of
improving the position of women in the workplace should play a
role in eradicating sex discrimination.
The inequality approach also would impose immense eviden-
tiary burdens on the parties and the courts. A case applying a the-
ory that says "[a] rule or practice is discriminatory. . . if it par-
ticipates in the systemic social deprivation of one sex because of
sex,"6 1 necessarily will be complex. In cases involving discrimina-
tion based on inequality, MacKinnon says, for example, that the
inequality theory should aim to eliminate "determinate acts, how-
ever unconscious, which preserve the control, access to resources,
and privilege of one group at the expense of another."62 How a
court could ever identify such "determinate acts" is obviously
problematic.
The problems of proof are complicated by several of MacKin-
non's statements, such as that "[nlational no more than irrational
sex differences are legitimate reasons for perpetuating the social
inequality of the sexes. ' 63 Irrational differences are easy to dismiss,
as the courts have done. Determining the rational sex differences,
however, is a much more difficult task. Reproductive functions are
one obvious difference between men and women, but what follows
from that difference is uncertain. The problem of workplace expo-
sure to substances hazardous to reproduction" is a good example
of a difficult problem: should all women with childbearing poten-
tial be banned from the workplace? Would the possible harm to a
fetus be a legitimate difference justifying disparate treatment, or
would the inequality approach label this an impermissible subordi-
nation of women? If there are differences, as in reproductive func-
tions, perhaps differences in legal treatment based on them some-
times may be permissible or even desirable. The difficulty is in
ensuring that the difference is not treated as a detriment.
""[White males have long been advantaged precisely on racial and sexual grounds,
differentially favored in employment and education because they were white and male. To
intervene to alter this balance of advantage is not discrimination in reverse, but a chance for
equal consideration for the first time." MAcKINNON at 119 (emphasis in original).
61 Id. at 117.
42 Id. at 127.
"3 Id. at 103.
" For discussion of this problem, see Comment, Employment Rights of Women in The
Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1113 (1977); Comment, Birth Defects Caused by Paren-
tal Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law,
12 MICH. J.L. REF. 237 (1979).
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Many of the questions that would be raised by investigations
of sex roles do not have clear-cut answers. Some are social policy
questions that cannot be answered by appeals to research or schol-
arship. Accordingly, one may wonder whether courts should at-
tempt to answer such questions at all. It is difficult to imagine a
court agreeing with MacKinnon that,
first, the exchange of sex for survival has historically assured
women's economic dependence and inferiority as well as sex-
ual availability to men. Second, sexual harassment expresses
the male sex-role pattern of coercive sexual initiation toward
women, often in vicious and unwanted ways. Third, women's
sexuality largely defines women as women in this society, so
violations of it are abuses of women as women.e5
In addressing such important and emotional issues as real sex
differences and the role of men and women in society, dispassion-
ate inquiry may be impossible, even if a court attempts to be fair.
Theories change, and many are created by people more concerned
with what agrees with their ideology than with what is true. With
the investigations of the type envisioned by MacKinnon, in which
theories may be relied upon by courts, feminists and nonfeminists
alike would stand in trembling anticipation that their instincts
would be discredited by scientific research. Furthermore, if a study
claimed that men or women were "inferior" in a certain respect, we
would not want to give the imprimatur of the courts to such a the-
ory, just as it would be unacceptable for a court to accept any the-
ory of racial inferiority.
Indeed, the courts have resisted engaging in such penetrating
analysis of our society. Courts have dealt with sexist practices, but
rarely have they attempted to analyze sexism. The airline weight
cases are examples of this cautious approach."6 Maximum weight
requirements that are more stringent for female flight attendants
have survived Title VII challenges. Under these weight rules, men
are allowed greater deviation from national weight averages or
weights recommended by health professionals.6 1 Courts find that
65 MACKINNON at 174.
66 Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), afi'd, 577 F.2d
869 (4th Cir. 1978). Cf. Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
afl'd, 568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977) (height requirement).
67 See Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 889 (E.D. Va. 1977), alI'd,
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978). One case, however, has suggested that maximum weight re-
strictions more generous to males than to females may constitute disparate treatment. Asso-
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the airlines' rules are reasonable grooming regulations, even though
the basis of the different requirements is a cultural preference for
slim women. One opinion stated as much: "This Court is not so
naive as to fail to recognize that Eastern's personal appearance
standards . . . perpetuates [sic] certain sex stereotypes." 8 Courts
have not scrutinized the social requirement that women be more
beautiful than men.
Ideology and politics do have a role in the formulation of legal
rules. Ideology is the basis for many of our laws governing mar-
riage, intestate devolution of property, taxation, and discrimina-
tion. It is deeply troubling, however, that the cause of feminism is
impeded by reliance on outrageous assertions and unprofessional
research; too many people on both sides are unmindful of complex-
ity, impatient with research, and disbelieving in science. There is
serious scholarship on the role of women in society; MacKinnon,
unfortunately, uses too little of it.69 She could be more persuasive
if she limited her alienating excesses70 and relied more on those
sources.
71
Application of traditional theories of disparate treatment and
disparate impact could avoid the perils of pontification and form
the basis for the prohibition of most discriminatory practices. To
ciation of Flight Attendants v. Ozark Air Lines, 470 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. 111. 1979). In that
case, in which the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the airline's maxi-
mum weight for men exceeded their "desirable" weight as determined by an insurance com-
pany chart. The maximum weight for women, however, was less than the national average
for women by as much as 27 pounds. Id. at 1133.
OS Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D. Va. 1977), afl'd, 577
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
" There is a long list, but for a good beginning see A. SCHLEGEL, SEXUAL STRATIFICA-
TION: A CROSS-CULTURAL VIEW (1977); WOMEN AND Socimy: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER
(S. Tiffany ed. 1979); M. WHYrE, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1978).
70 For examples of her alienating remarks, see text at notes 31, 65 supra; notes 30-31
supra.
71 One of MacKinnon's most glaring instances of neglect of research and failure to con-
sider her statements carefully is her pseudo-scientific observation that "[a] job, no matter
how menial, offers [to a woman] the potential for independence from the nuclear family,
which makes women dependent upon men for life necessities." MAcKINNON at 216. Rather
than referring to anthropological studies of kinship systems, she makes the assertion with-
out attempting to justify it. She fails to explain why or how the nuclear family makes a
woman more dependent than does an extended family; nor does she explain whether this
asserted dependence results from biological or from cultural (presumably mutable) forces.
She fails to acknowledge that the concomitants of any kinship system vary throughout a
woman's life-as a girl, a new mother, a grandmother. Different expectations and responsi-
bilities apply to each. I respect the urgency with which MacKinnon attacks the serious
problems of sex discrimination and sexual harassment, but she should be both practical and
accurate. I fear that she is neither.
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the extent McKinnon's theory is workable-courts can deal with
easily recognizable elements and consequences of sexism-it is un-
necessary. MacKinnon admits that the disparate impact theory
partly incorporates the inequality perspective. As Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.7 2 established, disparate impact can suffice to make out a
prima facie case of employment discrimination, even where the
disproportionate impact is due to social conditions and was not
caused by the defendant, the policy in question, or prior law.73
Disparate impact can remedy sexual harassment without much
difficulty in most cases. A complaining woman can show that, in
the workplace, most supervisors are heterosexual males and that
therefore women as subordinates are in a position to be harassed.
She can argue that few men are sexually harassed, because they
can fire any subordinate woman who harasses them. Also, she can
cite studies purporting to show that sexual harassment is the result
of a desire to dominate rather than of sexual attraction. 4 She can
point to studies showing that men are taught to be sexually more
aggressive than women, making it more likely that they will harass
women rather than the reverse." The obvious question is why, if
disparate impact analysis is so versatile, it is necessary to adopt an
inequality approach that requires the judiciary to see what is not
yet discernible.
Most courts that have considered the question have antici-
pated MacKinnon's conclusion that sexual harassment is unlaw-
ful sex discrimination. Those cases, however, have been based on
7 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
73 MAcKINNON at 206-07.
7" See id. at 162.
71 See, e.g., Staples, Male-Female Sexual Variations: Functions of Biology or Culture?,
9 J. SEXUAL RESPONSE 11-20 (1973), quoted in MAcKINNON at 152.
'$ MacKinnon, however, believes that her manuscript may have been "pivotal, in litiga-
tion establishing sexual harassment as a legal claim and term of art." MAcKINNON at xi.
7 Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Brown v.
City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. May 30, 1980); Neidhardt v.
D.H. Holmes Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 452 (E.D. Ia. 1979); Rinkel v. Associated Pipe-
line Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska 1978); Heelan v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978); Stringer v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Community
Affairs, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp.
459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally 51 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 148 (1976); Comment, Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53
WASH. L. REv. 123 (1977).
The EEOC's guidelines on sexual harassment make a frontal attack on the problem:
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traditional theories, showing that those theories are adequate to
§ 1604.11 Sexual harassment.
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
(c) ... [An employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the spe-
cific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regard-
less of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence ...
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is respon-
sible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents
or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can
show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74677 (1980) (to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11) (footnote omitted).
Substantially similar interim guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980), were used in Brown
v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627, 1631-32 (W.D. Okla. May 30, 1980), and
were cited with approval in a non-Title VII case, Continental Can Co. v. State, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1808, 1813 (Minn. July 3, 1980). In Continental Can, the court held that
the prohibition against sex discrimination contained in the state human rights law prohib-
ited sexual harassment by a coworker. This is one of the first cases to impose liability on an
employer for the actions of nonsupervisory personnel.
The interim EEOC guidelines were criticized by some. E.g., Sex Harassment Rules: A
Help or a Hindrance?, Chi. Tribune, June 22, 1980, § 5, at 3, col. 1 (interview with William
Knapp, attorney with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Whoa Now, Ms. Norton, Nat'l L.J.,
May 19, 1980, at 14, col. 2 (editorial). For a summary of selected public comments on the
guidelines, see Comments on Proposed EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 118 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) E-1 (June 17, 1980). Opposition to the guidelines centered on employer
liability for actions of nonsupervisory personnel. Id. at E-1, -2, -4. But see id. at E-6 (Com-
ment by Working Women's Institute favoring liability).
Although the EEOC Guidelines, if employed by courts, can be expected to have far-
reaching consequences, the most effective point of attack is at the workplace. Companies
and universities have been urged to establish and implement personnel policies forbidding
sexual harassment. See, e.g., E. Bloustein, President of Rutgers, Memorandum to All Uni-
versity Personnel (Feb. 5, 1979) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); J.
Martin, Vice President for University Personnel, Rutgers, Memorandum to Members of the
University Community: Sexual Harassment- Procedures for the Handling of Complaints
(June 28, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); Women Employed,
How to Combat Sexual Harassment in the Office (n.d.) (mimeographed handout) (on file
with The University of Chicago Law Review). The nation's largest employer has issued its
own statement of policy concerning sexual harassment. U.S. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, Policy Statement and Definition on Sexual Harassment (Dec. 12, 1979) (on file. with
The University of Chicago Law Review). This policy reads in part:
Specifically, sexual harassment is deliberate or repeated unsolicited verbal comments,
gestures, or physical contact of a sexual nature which are unwelcome.
Within the Federal Government, a supervisor who uses implicit or explicit coercive
Review1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review
deal with most sex discrimination. Overt discrimination is prohib-
ited by disparate treatment theory. Artificial barriers to employ-
ment are prevented by disparate impact analysis, which strikes a
balance between a recognition of historical deprivation and the
need of business to employ a competent workforce. The group-
reference problem has been reduced by judicial recognition that
the reference is present when the conduct is related to sex78 or
would not have been imposed on a member of the opposite sex;79
the problem also may be reduced by a proper understanding of the
"framework chosen to identify and describe the operational fea-
tures"80 of the challenged conduct.
MacKinnon is correct in saying that traditional legal theories
have inadequately addressed the social status of women. There is
something wrong with legal theories that approve of an employ-
ment system that, as MacKinnon says, takes account of the male
life cycle, but not that of the female.81 Traditional theories, how-
ever, have been utilized to remedy the situation. When Congress
passed the Pregnancy Disability Amendments, 2 it intended to
clarify the original congressional purpose by defining sex discrimi-
nation explicitly to include discrimination based on pregnancy.
The dissents in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert"' and Geduldig v.
Aiello" make clear that disparate treatment and disparate impact
could have yielded the same conclusion. More importantly, a
woman's family obligations or an employer's idea of a woman's
proper role have not sufficed as defenses, either as bona fide occu-
pational qualifications or as business necessity.8 5 Perhaps this out-
sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the career, salary, or job of an employee
is engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, an employee of an agency who behaves in
this manner in the process of conducting agency business is engaging in sexual
harassment.
Finally, any employee who participates in deliberate or repeated unsolicited verbal
comments, gestures or physical contact of a sexual nature which are unwelcome and
interfere in work productivity is also engaging in sexual harassment.
78 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7' See Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 452, 468 (E.D. La.
1979).
80 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 147 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 MAcKINNON at 118.
81 Pub. L. No. 95-955, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
429 U.S. 125, 146-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84 417 U.S. 484, 497-505 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., Reeb v. Marshall, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 124, 126 (8th Cir. June 19, 1980)
(dictum): "If it were true that Reeb was discharged because she did not behave as her su-
pervisor believed a woman should, Reeb's claim of discrimination would be established and
we would be required to reverse."
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come shows that courts understand the relationship between stere-
otype and conforming behavior. At least the courts are willing to
use traditional theories of employment discrimination to some ex-
tent to aid social change rather than reflect the status quo.88
The problem with the traditional theories is not their content
but their uneven and attenuated application. Why, for example,
should sex be a bona fide occupational qualification for the job of
maximum security prison guard,8 7 when business necessity would
suffice? How can we persuade courts to take sex discrimination
claims as seriously as they take race discrimination claims? Why
are the race cases the "most highly developed application"' of dis-
crimination law?
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the criticism voiced above, MacKinnon's
book is a significant contribution to the literature of employment
discrimination. Her suggestions can be expected to spur serious in-
vestigation and analysis of sexual harassment. Although I am con-
vinced that her inequality standard has no chance of being
adopted in this century, her book is important for exposing the
unwillingness of our legal system to address sexism with the same
vigor with which it addresses racism. MacKinnon does not go far
enough in delineating the precise functions of her new approach,
however, perhaps because her theory admits of no precision. More-
over, the recognition of the injuries done to women by pervasive
sexism causes concern that the enforced inferiority is too deep to
be cured. MacKinnon recognizes this tension when she observes:
"Balancing an indictment of the damage with an affirmation of the
positivity of womanhood, while claiming women's right to be
Dramatic progress in attacking sexism through sexual harassment suits may result from
the opinion in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1660 (S.D.N.Y. June 6,
1980). The plaintiff's claim that the company "required her to wear a revealing and provoca-
tive uniform which subjected her to repeated and abusive sexual harassment," id. at 1661,
survived a motion for summary judgment. This case could have a significant impact on the
working conditions of waitresses in bars and nightclubs.
se An example of this is the comparable-worth movement, which has sought to require
employers to pay women the same amount as that paid to men in comparable, though not
identical, positions. In one such case, a claim under Title VII survived a motion for sum-
mary judgment. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980).
67 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). See generally MAcKINNON at
138-41.
" MAcKrNoN at 4.
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treated the same as everyone else, is the challenge that women's
inequality poses." 89 The inequality theory develops and highlights
this tension, but fails to resolve it.
89 Id. at 143-44.
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